Recent Monetary Developments and Controversies by David E. Lindsey
DAVID  E.  LINDSEY 




ECONOMIC developments  during  the past year were distinctly  unkind  to 
the nostrums of  monetary economists. The phenomenal growth of 
negotiable orders of withdrawal  (NOW accounts) and money market 
mutual  fund shares and, more recently, the emergence of retail sweep 
accounts reopened questions about the stability  of money demand  and 
the value of monetary  aggregates  as intermediate  targets.  The stubborn 
persistence of high interest rates in the face of unwinding  inflation  and 
deepening  recession  puzzled  many  economists. Observing  the continued 
volatility  of both interest rates and money, some critics of the Federal 
Reserve's new operating  procedures  concluded  that  short-run  monetary 
control was receiving too little attention  while other critics concluded 
just the reverse. 
This paper  reviews monetary  developments  in the past year and  their 
bearing on these controversies. The first section examines whether 
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financial  innovations have perceptibly altered the velocity of various 
monetary  aggregates,  with special  emphasis  on the experience  over 1981 
as a whole. The second section reviews  recent  quarterly  data  on relations 
among  money  demand,  short-term  interest  rates,  real  income, and  prices 
and attempts to sort out the sources both of the continuance of high 
short-term  interest rates and of recent intrayearly  swings in money 
demand.  A final section of the paper  reflects on the meaning  of erratic 
short-run  money  growth  and  its implications  for how precisely  to control 
monetary  aggregates  and for the usefulness of intermediate  monetary 
targets. 
Financial Innovations and Velocity Behavior 
Contrasting  views have recently been advanced on the impact of 
financial  innovations  on the relations  between the monetary  aggregates 
and broader  economic conditions. Some commentators  argue that the 
current  wave of innovations  is significantly  affecting  these relations  and 
in the long run may even threaten  the viability  of intermediate  money- 
stock targets.' Others take an opposing position, contending  that MI 
velocity, at least, has not departed  much in recent years from  historical 
patterns.2 
In an effort to bring  empirical  evidence to bear on these issues, this 
section analyzes recent growth  rates of the velocity of monetary  aggre- 
gates in the context of longer-term  trends. Table 1 breaks the period 
since 1960  into three seven-year  subperiods.  The third  one conveniently 
begins with the previous episode of financial  innovations in the mid- 
1970s, when adoption of  new corporate cash-management  devices 
intensified.3 
1. See, for example,  Anthony  M. Solomon,  president,  Federal  Reserve Bank  of New 
York,  remarks  before  thejoint  luncheon  of the  American  Economic  and  American  Finance 
Association,  December  28, 1981,  and Frank  E. Morris,  president,  Federal  Reserve Bank 
of Boston, "Do the Monetary  Aggregates  Have a Future  as Targets  of Federal  Reserve 
Policy?"  The New England Economic  Review (March-April  1982),  pp. 5-14. 
2.  Beryl  W.  Sprinkel,  under  secretary  of the  treasury  for  monetary  affairs,  "Statement" 
before the Subcommittee  on Domestic Monetary  Policy of the Committee  on Banking, 
Finance  and  Urban  Affairs,  March  3, 1982,  pp. 3-4, and  Economic Report ofthe President, 
Februaty 1982, page  63. 
3. See Stephen  M. Goldfeld,  "The Case of the Missing  Money," BPEA, 3:1976, pp. 
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Table  1.  Average  Percent  Changes  of Various  Velocity  Measures,  Three-Month 
Treasury  Bill Rate,  and  Real  GNPa 
Percent 
Velocity measiureb 
"Shift-  Three- 
ad-  month 
"Old"  jlusted"  Treasutiy  Real 
Ml  Ml  Ml  M2  bill rcatec  GNP 
Period and measlure  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
1961-67 
Mean  3.3  3.3  3.3  -0.4  11.4  5.0 
Standard deviation  2.2  2.2  2.2  2.3  10.9  1.5 
1968-74 
Mean  2.6  2.6  2.6  0.5  9.8  2.7 
Standard deviation  1.6  1.7  1.6  2.5  26.7  3.1 
1975-81 
Mean  3.7  6.5  4.4  0.3  9.9  2.9 
Standard deviation  1.3  4.8  1.6  2.7  25.6  2.2 
Memoranda 
1975  4.8  4.9  4.9  -  1.9  -23.6  2.2 
1976  2.9  3.5  3.1  -  3.8  -  16.9  4.4 
1977  3.7  4.1  3.8  0.7  30.7  5.8 
1978  5.5  6.3  5.8  5.6  40.3  5.3 
1979  2.3  4.8  3.1  1.4  38.2  1.7 
1980  1.9  4.1  2.6  0.2  14.9  -0.3 
1981  4.5  18.1  7.3  0.2  -  13.7  0.9 
Sources:  Board  of  Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System  for  monetary  stock  and Treasury  bills  rate data. 
Nominal and real GNP are from the national income  and product accounts. 
a.  Fourth quarter to fourth quarter. 
b.  Velocity  is the ratio of nominal GNP  to a monetary  aggregate.  The  several  velocity  growth rates shown  here 
correspond to different monetary aggregates.  MI is defined as currency outside the Treasury, Federal Reserve  banks, 
and the vaults of commercial  banks; traveler's  checks  of nonbank issuers; demand deposits  at all commercial  banks 
other than those due to domestic  banks; the U.S.  government,  and foreign banks and official institutions  minus cash 
items  in  the  process  of  collection  and  Federal  Reserve  float;  and other  checkable  deposits  (OCD)  consisting  of 
negotiable  orders  of  withdrawal  (NOW),  automatic  transfer  service  (ATS),  and credit  union  share draft (CUSD) 
accounts,  and demand deposits  at mutual savings  banks.  "Old"  Ml  is  MI  minus other  checkable  deposits.  Shift- 
adjusted MI is MI minus that portion of OCD estimated  to have shifted from non-Ml  sources;  this estimate  is one- 
third of OCD inflows  from  1975 through  1980. For  1981, growth of the  Board's  "shift-adjusted"  MI  is  used,  with 
the fraction  of  net  OCD  inflows  in excess  of  trend coming  from non-MI  sources  estimated  to  be  221/2  percent  in 
January and  271/2 percent  in  the  remaining  months  of  the  year.  M2  is  defined  as  Ml  plus  savings  and  small 
denomination  time  deposits  at all depository  institutions,  overnight  repurchase  agreements  at commercial  banks, 
overnight Eurodollars held by U.S.  residents other than banks at Caribbean branches of member banks, and balances 
of money  market mutual funds (general purpose and broker-dealer). 
c.  Secondary  market. 
Innovation and the Monetary Aggregates, " BPEA, 1:1979, pp. 213-29; Thomas D. Simpson 
and Richard D. Porter, "Some  Issues  Involving  the Definition and Interpretation of the 
Monetary  Aggregates,"  in  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Boston,  Cbntrolling  Monetaty 
Aggregates  III, Conference  Series 23 (FRBB,  October 1980), pp. 161-234; and Donald D. 
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CHANGING  CONCEPTS  OF  MI  VELOCITY 
Annual velocity growth of MI as currently  measured is shown in 
column  1. The trend  growth  of this measure  rose from  2.6 percent  a year 
in  the middle  subperiod  to 3.7 percent  since 1974,  despite  similar  average 
percent changes in Treasury  bill rates and real income (last two col- 
umns).4  This increase  in trend  growth  of about 1 percentage  point is not 
enormous, although  it implies that by 1981  the level of MI needed to 
support  actual  nominal  GNP would be about  7 percent  (or $31.5 billion) 
lower  than  would  have been predicted  on the basis of the average  annual 
velocity growth  of 2.6 percent  that  prevailed  during  1968-74. 
However, the Federal  Reserve was not targeting  this measure  of M1 
until  the monetary  aggregates  were redefined  in February  1980.  At that 
time the definition  of narrow money was expanded to include other 
checkable deposits (OCDs)-primarily composed of NOW accounts, 
ATS accounts (automatic transfer service), and credit union share 
drafts-and this aggregate  was transitionally  relabeled  MI  B. The annual 
velocity growth  of MI excluding  OCDs, essentially  old MI  , accelerated 
markedly  during  the last seven years, particularly  in 1981,  as shown in 
column  2. The Federal  Reserve, in establishing  annual  ranges  for old MI 
before 1980  and  forMlA and  M1B  (or  its equivalent,  new Ml) thereafter, 
attempted  to take account of the effects of expansion in OCDs. The 
evolution  of OCDs  thus required  the Federal  Reserve to keep monetary 
targets  and  definitions  abreast  of developments. 
This point only initiates  a complete analysis  of the effects of financial 
innovations  on MI velocity behavior.  The expansion  of ATS and NOW 
accounts,  which  are  presently  included  in Ml, has been boosted  by shifts 
from savings deposits and other non-Mi sources, thereby raising  the 
growth of MI demand  above what it would otherwise have been. The 
implication  is that  the velocity of actual  MI has grown  more slowly than 
would  have been the case if OCDs  had  never  been introduced.  Owing  to 
the year-end 1980 introduction  of nationwide NOWs, this effect was 
4. In standard  MI demand  functions  the partial  elasticity  with  respect  to interest  rates 
is negative  and-consistent  with an inventory  theory of money demand-the elasticity 
with  respect  to real  income  is positive  but  less than  unity.  Thus  increases  in both  raise  MI 
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particularly  pronounced last year, when the velocity of  actual M1 
increased  2/4 percentage  points more slowly than  the velocity of an MI 
measure  that attempts  to abstract  from the effects of NOWs, shown in 
column 3. The latter "shift-adjusted"  measure removes from MI an 
estimate  of the funds switched  to NOW accounts  from  non-MI sources 
in 1981,  on the grounds  that such inflows distorted  the demand  for MI 
relative  to its historical  determinants.5  It is estimated  that $12/4 billion 
shifted  from  non-MI sources to OCDs during  that year.6 
This adjusted  concept in earlier years is shown in column 3 by the 
velocity growth  of an unofficial  estimate of shift-adjusted  MI, which is 
constructed  by subtracting  from  M  I an estimate  of the fraction  of inflows 
to OCDs  from  non-M  I sources  in  those years.  The  growth  of this  adjusted 
M1 velocity was 13/4  percentage  points faster, on average, in the third 
subperiod  than in the second. By 1981  the velocity growth  of this shift- 
adjusted  measure  exceeded its trend  in the second subperiod  by almost 
43/4 percentage  points. In that year the velocity of actual MI, shown in 
column 1, grew a bit faster than its historical trend, despite shifts of 
savings  balances  into OCDs. These shifts, which  reduced  velocity, were 
more than offset by the effect of other unusual  factors at work in the 
opposite direction. 
A conventional  interest  rate  response  is not one of these other  factors 
increasing velocity. Indeed, in two of the three years in which MI 
velocity growth accelerated to above 4 percent, 1975 and 1981, the 
decline  in the Treasury  bill rate  represented  a marked  deceleration  in its 
annual  rate  of change. 
What,  then, were  the other  factors?  The  sources  of more  rapid  velocity 
growth  than expected around  the mid-1970s  have been examined  else- 
5. The distortion  arose from the higher  marginal  own rates on transactions  balances 
available  on nationwide  NOWs  and  the relatively  high  minimum  balance  requirements  for 
these newly offered accounts. The Federal  Reserve set a 1981  growth  range  of 3/2  to 6 
percent  for this shift-adjusted  measure-down from  the 4 to 61/2  percent  range  for actual 
M1B  in 1980. 
6. Estimates  of the shift in 1981  were derived  from surveys  of banks  and households 
as well as cross-section  regressions  of changes  in demand  or savings  deposits  on changes 
in OCD.  For  further  discussion,  see David  E. Lindsey, "Nonborrowed  Reserve  Targeting 
and  Monetary  Control,"  forthcoming  in Lawrence  Meyer, ed., Improving  Money  Stock 
Control: Problems,  Solutions,  and Consequences  (Federal Reserve  Bank of St.  Louis, 
1982),  and  Thomas  D. Simpson,  John  R. Williams  and others, "Recent Revisions in the 
Money  Stock: Benchmark,  Seasonal  Adjustment,  and Calculation  of Shift-Adjusted  M1- 
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where  in some  detail.7  The 1981  experience  recently  has  been scrutinized 
by Federal Reserve Board staff. In one study, Michael Moran and 
Donald  Kohn  estimated  that  the $100  billion  expansion  of money market 
mutual  fund shares (MMMFs)  during 1981  depressed MI demand  and 
raised MI velocity by noticeable amounts.8  From survey results and 
data  on deposit turnover,  they tentatively  concluded  that, at most, only 
4 percent  of MMMFs  were actively being  used for transaction  purposes 
and hence were being substituted  directly  for MI balances. This figure 
implied  that growth  in MMMFs  directly  reduced  MI demand  over 1981 
by only $4 billion  or about 1 percent. However, the indirect  effects, by 
which the liquidity  and the high market  return  of MMMFs induced a 
further  transfer  of funds  from  Ml , were more  difficult  to gauge. Several 
ingenious  econometric  tests-including  substituting  an MMMF  rate  for 
the passbook savings rate in the MIT-Pennsylvania-Social  Science 
Research  Council  (MPS)  quarterly  money-demand  function  and exam- 
ining the contribution  of MMMFs to growth of monetary services as 
captured  by a divisia monetary  aggregate-gave  somewhat conflicting 
results. On balance, Moran  and Kohn were led to think that the total 
effect had reduced MI demand  last year somewhere between 1 and 4 
percent. 
Even after netting out an increase of 2?/2 percentage points-the 
midpoint  of Moran  and  Kohn's estimated  range  for the overall  impact  of 
MMMFs-the growth of shift-adjusted  MI velocity over 1981  remains 
higher  than historical  trends. Apportioning  the sources of the residual 
strength  is not easy, but  an apparent  further  spread  of cash-management 
techniques  to households and medium-  and smaller-sized  corporations 
may  have played  a role. 
In  any event, the foregoing  analysis  suggests  caution  about  predicting 
future  stability  of actual MI velocity growth. The recent tendency for 
unusual  factors  depressing  M  I velocity growth  to nearly  balance  unusual 
factors raising it may not persist in coming years. In particular,  the 
public's stock adjustment  from existing saving balances in M2 to new 
7.  See note 3 for references. 
8.  Memorandum, Michael Moran and Donald Kohn to Stephen Axilrod, "The Effects 
of MMMFs on M1-B: A Review  of the Evidence,"  Board of Governors  of the Federal 
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nationwide  NOW accounts-as  opposed to placement of funds into 
existing NOW accounts from new savings out of  income or from 
nonsavings  balances in response to interest rate variations-seems  to 
have about run its course. During 1981 the growth of the number  of 
NOW and ATS accounts at an annual  rate slowed from an enormous 
pace through  May to 47 percent at commercial  banks and 33 percent at 
sampled  savings and loan institutions  from May to August. The growth 
rate  of such accounts then fell to 19.4  percent  at commercial  banks  from 
August  to February,  and  to a similar  rate  at savings  and  loans, according 
to available  evidence. This pace has probably  decelerated  further  since 
then.9  In other  words, the effects stemming  from  the introduction  of new 
checkable accounts that have damped  actual Ml velocity for the past 
seven years, and particularly  over 1981,  are abating.  The question  then 
becomes whether  the effects of factors  acting  to bolster  M  I velocity also 
are  diminishing  or are  instead  picking  up steam. In large  part,  the answer 
may depend not only on the prospective advance of MMMFs  but also 
on the speed with which  new sweep arrangements  are  adopted,  transfer- 
ring  funds between fixed-balance  demand  deposits on the one hand  and 
NOW accounts, MMMFs, and repurchase agreements (RPs) on the 
other. Decisive evidence on this question may well be provided  during 
the next several months. 
M2  VELOCITY 
Doubts about the future stability  of MI velocity growth  might  draw 
one's attention  to broader  monetary  aggregates.  The stable behavior  of 
M2 velocity over each of the last three years, particularly  the last two, 
is a rather striking feature of table 1. Based on that experience, a 
prediction  of little change  in M2 velocity in coming  years might  be made 
with some assurance. Indeed, such a prediction  is implicitly  embodied 
in the range  of forecasts by individual  Federal  Open  Market  Committee 
(FOMC)  members of 8 to  10?/2  percent for this year's nominal GNP 
9.  In absolute  terms,  NOW  and ATS  accounts  at commercial  banks numbered 9.2 
million in May  1981, 10.3 million three months later (August  1981) and 11.3 million nine 
months later (February  1982). In light of  the falloff  of  shifting of funds  to new  NOW 
accounts  from  existing  demand  and  savings  balances,  the  Federal  Reserve  ceased 
calculating a shift-adjusted MI in January 1982. 252  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1982 
growth  in light of the committee's expectation that in 1982  M2 growth 
will probably  be in the upper  part  of its 6 to 9 percent  range. 
One reason M2 velocity has been more stable and predictable in 
recent years involves the increasing  importance  of MMMFs and RPs 
without  ceilings and new small-denomination  time deposits with yields 
linked  to market  rates, such as the six-month  money market  certificate, 
the 2?/2-year  small-saver  certificate, and the all-saver certificate. The 
fraction  of the nontransaction  component  of M2 bearing  market-related 
yields grew from  less than 5 percent  in early 1978  to over 64 percent  by 
March 1982. As  a result, the sensitivity of M2 and its velocity to 
movements  in market  interest  rates has lessened appreciably. 
STABILITY  VERSUS  CONTROL 
The,  relative  stability  and  predictability  of M2 velocity also derives in 
part  from  the  fact  that  greater  weight  is given  to M  I in  monetary  targeting. 
With M  1 more nearly the exogenous monetary  aggregate  over annual 
periods, both nominal  income and M2 respond  in the same direction  to 
unexpected shocks to the demand  functions for aggregate  spending  or 
MI. The responsiveness  of the velocity of M2  to such disturbances  thus 
is muted when M2 is endogenous compared  to the case in which it is 
determined  exogenously and MI is endogenous. 
This point can be illustrated  in a simple IS = LM framework,  where 
nominal  income and the nominal  interest  rate are represented  by Y  and 
i. 10 
The aggregate  spending  (IS) equation  is 
(1)  Y=  a  -  bi +  el; 
the MI demand  equation  is 
(2)  MID  = d -  fi  + gY + e2; 
10. This analysis is in the spirit of William Poole,  "Optimal Choice of Monetary Policy 
Instruments in a Simple Stochastic  Macro Model,"  Quarterly Journal of Economics,  vol. 
84 (May 1970), pp.  197-216, and is analogous to the examination of reduced-form errors 
for  multipliers  relating  money  to  reserves  with  alternative  reserve  operating  targets 
appearing in David E. Lindsey and others, "Short-Run Monetary Control: Evidence under 
the New  Operating Procedures"  (Board of Governors  of the Federal Reserve  System, 
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and  the nontransactions  component  of the M2 demand  equation  is 
(3)  NTD=  h -  ji  + kY + e3. 
M2  is defined  as 
(4)  M2 =  MI  +  NT. 
When  Ml is held exogenous at Ml, the reduced-form  expressions  for Y 
and  M2 can be decomposed  into a predicted  value, which  is indicated  by 
superscript  p, and an error  term  as follows: 
(5)  YIMl  =  YpIMI +  Yerror|Ml 
where 
YP  I Ml  af  -  bd +  bMl 
Y<M1~  f +bg 
Y error  Ml=  fe,  -  be2  Yerror~M1  f+bg 
(6)  M2IMI  = M2P M1  + M2errorIMl 
where 
M2P  I  Ml 
h(f  +  bg)  -  d(bk + j)  +  a(fk  -  jg)  +  (f  +  bg + j  +  kb)MI 
f  + bg 
e  (fk  -  jg)eI  -  (bk + j)e2  +  (f  + bg)e3 
M2  error | Ml1=  f  +  bg 
By contrast,  the  reduced-form  expression  for Ywhen  M2  is determined 
exogenously at M2 is 
(7)  Y|M2  =  YpIM2 +  YerrorIM2 
where 
YP M2 =a(f  +j)  -  b(d +  h) +  bM2 
Y~~M2=  (f  +j)  +b(g  +k) 
(f  + j)eI  -  b(e2 +  e3)  Yerror  M2=  (f  +j)  +  b(g +  k) 
Examination  of the error terms in equations 5 and 6 indicates that 
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income and M2 when Ml  is fixed. A positive shock to the spending 
function (el >  0) with Ml  fixed raises Y, though its effect on M2 is 
theoretically  ambiguous.  The higher  income tends to raise the quantity 
demanded  of NT, the nontransactions  component  of M2, but the asso- 
ciated increase in the interest rate works in the opposite direction. 
However, the marked  increase since mid-1978  in the proportion  of this 
component  bearing  market-related  yields has substantially  lowered its 
responsiveness to movements in market interest rates (that is, j  is 
approaching  zero). Accordingly, it seems clear that the income effect 
substantially  outweighs  the interest  rate effect and that nominal  income 
and M2 will be positively correlated  in response to a shift in spending 
behavior. 
A downward  shift in Ml demand (e2 <  0) not accommodated  by a 
reduced  Ml target  will lower the interest  rate and raise income. At the 
same time, both effects serve to increase  the quantity  demanded  of NT 
(though  the interest rate effect is likely small, as noted above). This 
analysis has relevance for the experience in 1981 when, as discussed 
below, an apparent  downward drift in the shift-adjusted  Ml  demand 
function  of historical  proportions  had little impact  on M2 velocity. 
Sympathetic  movements  of Yand  M2  in  response  to these disturbances 
cushion  the variability  of M2 velocity compared  to the situation  with an 
exogenously determined M2. In the latter case,  as may be seen in 
equation 7, the income numerator  in the M2 velocity expression is 
affected  by all three  of the equations'  errors,  but  the M2 denominator  is, 
by assumption,  unchanged. 
The outcome of this analysis  is simply  that  the error  properties  of M2 
velocity predictions depend upon whether M2 is endogenous or held 
exogenous. Should the Federal Reserve switch to more single-minded 
control  over M2, there is the danger  that  what  appears  in recent years to 
be rather  stable and predictable  behavior  of M2 velocity would tend to 
break  down.  I 
Such  a concern  is becoming  increasingly  academic,  however, because 
11.  This analysis provides support for Goodhart's law-that  the relation between GNP 
and a monetary aggregate tends to weaken when the aggregate is brought under control- 
and  offers  an  example  of  a  variant  of  the  Lucas  effect.  See  Robert  E.  Lucas,  Jr., 
"Econometric  Policy Evaluation: A Critique," in Karl Brunner and Allan Meltzer, eds., 
The Phillips Curve and Labor Markets, Carnegie-Rochester  Conference  Series on Public 
Policy,  vol.  1 (Amsterdam: North-Holland,  1976), pp. 19-46. David  E. Lindsey  255 
the Federal  Reserve's ability  to control  M2 closely is eroding  with each 
passing  phase-down  of member  bank  reserve requirements  on personal 
savings and small time-deposits under provisions of  the Monetary 
Control  Act. By March 1984  these requirements  will reach zero. Other 
major nontransactions  components of M2-savings  and small time- 
deposits at other institutions, MMMF  shares, RPs, and overnight  Eu- 
rodollars-are even now not reservable. 
Money Stock Variability, Money Demand Predictability, and 
Interest Rates 
The enormous  growth  in the velocity of shift-adjusted  MI in 1981  is 
mirrored  by a record  postsample  overprediction  of annual  growth  in this 
aggregate using the Almon lag money-demand  equation in the MPS 
quarterly  model. The relatively  long lags built into this equation  damp 
the predicted response of money demand in the current quarter to 
contemporaneous  movements in the independent variables-real  in- 
come, prices, and interest  rates. When  MI is measured  to abstract  from 
the effects of nationwide  NOWs, money  demand  grows  weakly  through- 
out the year, leading  to an overprediction  on the order  of 6 percentage 
points  for the year as a whole, as shown in the memoranda  of table 2. 
The table also reports  the remarkably  successful annual  forecasting 
record of an alternative  equation, which, like the MPS equation, also 
was fit with data through  mid-1974.  The success of the Porter-Simpson 
equation  primarily  is due to the inclusion of a ratchet  type of variable, 
involving  the interest  rate  on five-year  Treasury  notes. This variable  and 
its elasticity increase as the current  five-year note yield rises above a 
moving  average  of its own recent values.  12  The rationale  for the variable 
is that such an intermediate  rate represents  the expectations of money 
holders about short-term  rates and therefore the opportunity  costs of 
holding  rate-constrained  narrow  money over a horizon  long enough to 
affect decisions regarding  investment  in cash-management  techniques. 
12.  Simpson  and Porter,  "Some  Issues."  For an analysis of the implications  of this 
equation for the  setting  and optimal  adjustment of  the  intermediate  target for MI  see 
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Table 2.  Actual  and Predicted  Growth  of Ml,  1980:1  through  1982:la 
Percent 
Actual  Ml 
(shift-  MPS  equation  Porter-Simpson  equation 
adjusted 
Year and  through  Predicted  Predicted 
quarter  1981:4)  Ml  Errorb  Ml  Errorb 
1980:1  6.2  5.4  0.8  3.0  3.2 
1980:2  -  3.7  7.2  -  10.9  3.5  -  7.2 
1980:3  13.2  9.1  4.1  7.8  5.4 
1980:4  10.2  6.2  4.0  9.1  1.1 
1981:1  -0.9  6.4  -  7.3  6.5  -  7.4 
1981:2  5.7  8.3  -  2.6  -  3.2  8.9 
1981:3  -0.4  7.4  -7.8  2.7  -3.1 
1981:4  4.7  9.4  -4.7  6.1  -  1.4 
1982:1  10.3  5.7  4.6  0.8  9.5 
Memorandac 
1980  6.6  7.1  -  0.5  6.0  0.6 
1981  2.3  8.1  -5.8  3.1  -0.8 
Sources:  Board  of  Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System  and  simulations  based  on  the  study  reported  in 
Memorandum,  Edward  K.  Offenbacher  and  Richard  D.  Porter  to  Michael  Prell,  "Update  and  Extensions  on 
Econometric  Properties of Selected  Monetary Aggregates,"  Board of Governors,  April 7,  1982. 
a.  At seasonally  adjusted annual rates (not compounded). 
b.  Actual minus predicted. 
c.  Fourth quarter to fourth quarter. 
Increases  in this rate above its moving  average  serve as a proxy for the 
incentive  of money  holders  to adopt  further  innovations  in cash manage- 
ment. Porter  and Simpson's equation  implies  that the interest  elasticity 
of money demand  begins to increase as the yield structure  of interest 
rates moves above a certain point related to past levels.  Thus the 
equation is relatively responsive when interest rates rise to historical 
highs, as in the second and third quarters  of 1981. But existing cash- 
management  techniques  are assumed to remain  in place when interme- 
diate-term  interest  rates decline below the moving  average. In this case 
the ratchet variable converts to a negative constant, and the interest 
response  of the equation  behaves according  to the conventional  elastic- 
ity. 
INTEREST  RATES 
The Porter-Simpson  equation  thus tracks money demand  well over 
1981  as a whole by adding  another  economic variable  that predicts the David  E. Lindsey  257 
Table 3.  Actual  and  Predicted  Short-Term  Interest  Rates,  1980:1  through  1982:1 
Porter-Simpson  equation  (three-  St. Louis  equation  (four-month 
month Treasury bill rate)  commercial paper  rate) 
Period  Actual  Predicted  Error  Actual  Predicted  Error 
1980:1- 
1980:4  11.4  11.0  0.4  12.5  8.2  4.3 
Average 
1981:1- 
1982:1  13.8  13.2  0.6  14.8  6.9  7.9 
Average 
Sources:  Simulations  based  on  the  equations  reported  in Thomas  D.  Simpson  and  Richard D.  Porter,  "Some 
Issues  Involving the Definition and Interpretation of the Monetary Aggregates,"  in Federal Reserve  Bank of Boston, 
Controlling Monietaty Aggregates  III, Conference  Series 23 (FRBB,  October  1980), pp.  161-234, and "The Quarterly 
Econometric  Model"  (Board of Governors  of the Federal Reserve  System,  May  1981). 
incentive  to adopt  improved  techniques  of cash management.  13  Its ability 
to predict average MI demand  over this period suggests the levels of 
short-  and intermediate-term  interest rates on average since 1979  have 
been consistent with the average  levels of real income and prices given 
the quantity of shift-adjusted  MI supplied. To show this result more 
formally,  table 3 displays dynamic  simulation  predictions  of the Porter- 
Simpson  equation  solved for the three-month  Treasury  bill rate, using a 
supplementary  term-structure  equation  to explain  the five-year  note rate 
given current  and lagged predicted three-month  bill rates and current 
and  lagged inflation  rates.14 Averaged  over these periods, the predicted 
three-month  Treasury  bill rate is close to the actual  rate. 
The table also shows simulation  results  from an alternative  model of 
short-term  interest rates, originally  constructed  by staff at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis.15  This equation explains the four-month 
13.  A full  understanding  of  money-demand  behavior  in addition  requires  tracking 
down the repositories of the displaced money balances-as  in the study by Michael Moran 
and Donald Kohn discussed  in the previous section. 
14.  This term-structure equation is reported in "The Quarterly Econometric  Model" 
(Board of Governors  of the Federal Reserve  System,  May 1981). The sample period for 
this equation was 1956:4 through 1977:2. In the simulation the add factors to the intercepts 
of  both  the  Porter-Simpson  equation  and  the  term-structure  equation  were  made  to 
eliminate the level errors in 1979:4. 
15.  See Leonall C. Anderson and Keith M. Carlson, "The St. Louis Model Revisited," 
International Economic Review, vol.  15 (June 1974), pp. 305-27.  For the simulation in this 
paper, the  sample  period that began  in  1955:1 was  extended  through  1979:4, using an 258  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1982 
commercial  paper  rate  as related  negatively  to the current  quarter's  Ml 
growth,  and positively to current  and lagged  growth  in real GNP and to 
current  and lagged  values of the inflation  rate scaled by the ratio of the 
unemployment  rate to  the full-employment unemployment rate. A 
dummy  variable  also is included  starting  in 1961:  1. This equation's  large 
underprediction  of the commercial  paper  rate  in the first  postsample  year 
rises to nearly  8 percentage  points by the last five-quarter  period. 
Taken together, these results suggest that a money supply-money 
demand  framework  better explains the recent determination  of short- 
term  interest  rates than a "semireduced  form" theory implicitly  incor- 
porating  adaptive  inflationary  expectations. Thus, from  the perspective 
of the Porter-Simpson  equation,  no recourse  is needed  to ad hoc reasons 
such as erratic interest rates or variable short-run  money growth to 
explain  the high  average  levels of short-term  rates in this period. 
QUARTERLY  PREDICTIONS 
On a quarterly  basis the prediction errors for the Porter-Simpson 
equation  shown  in  table  2 and  the quarterly  interest  rate  errors  underlying 
table 3 were quite large, reinforcing  impressions  of the sizable residual 
uncertainty  in economists' understanding  of short-term  variations in 
money demand. In addition  to the impact of the ratchet variable, the 
equation  contains reasonably  short lags in response to the other varia- 
bles, particularly  prices, so that the predicted  values of MI growth  are 
more variable from one quarter to the next than those of the MPS 
equation.  However, these variations  do not match  the actual variation 
in  MI growth  very closely. For  example,  the weakness  in the first  quarter 
and  the bulge in the second quarter  shift-adjusted  MI in 1981  remains  a 
puzzle  from  the perspective  of this equation.  A huge underprediction  of 
quarterly  average MI growth also emerged  in the first quarter  of 1982, 
when MI grew by 101/4  percent at an annual  rate. The Porter-Simpson 
equation  predicted  MI growth  of only 3/4  percent. 
identical specification.  A postsample  simulation was then conducted from 1980:1 through 
1982:1. As is consistent with the present practice at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 
the equation was simulated with actual rather than shift-adjusted MI in 1981. Because  the 
equation contains neither a lagged dependent variable nor an autocorrelation correction, 
the static simulation amounted to a dynamic simulation as well. David  E. Lindsey  259 
This bulge in Ml growth recorded for the first quarter  reflects the 
more  rapid  MI expansion  that  began  in November  of last year,  following 
little change on balance over the previous six months. This strength  in 
MI demand, despite weakening nominal economic activity, was no 
doubt partly  caused by the conventional  lagged effects of interest rate 
declines during  the five preceding  months. However, table 4 suggests 
another  important  influence,  associated  with  changes  in savings  motives 
affecting  other  checkable  deposits. From  October  through  February  the 
average annual growth of OCDs accelerated by about 35 percentage 
points from the  15 percent pace of the previous six months. This 
acceleration in OCDs contributed 6  percentage points to  the  10?/4 
percentage  point acceleration  of the average  annual  growth  rate of MI 
over the four months. A striking feature of the table is the similar 
behavior of passbook saving flows. After substantial runoffs in the 
preceding half year, savings rebounded sharply. These patterns are 
unlike the surge in OCDs early in 1981, which could be attributed  to 
shifts  out of savings  and  demand  deposits into NOW accounts  that  were 
newly permitted nationwide.16  In this recent instance, by contrast, 
savings  deposits exhibited  strength  rather  than  weakness, while  the run- 
off of demand  deposits nearly  ceased. 
A plausible  partial  explanation  for the related  behavior  of OCDs and 
savings deposits over this four-month  period is that the public had 
temporarily  increased  its preference  for highly  liquid  assets in response 
to heightened uncertainties  regarding  both the economic outlook-as 
suggested  by the higher  unemployment  rate-and the  outlook  for  interest 
rates. Some support  for this interpretation  is provided  in the second row 
of table 4, which shows a remarkably  similar  pattern  for another  four- 
month  period  ending  in September  1980.17  Taken  together,  these episodes 
suggest  that  the increased  importance  of OCDs, now representing  nearly 
16.  See the discussion  above  of the slowdown  in growth of the number of new OCD 
accounts since the initial surge in early 1981. 
17.  Since this paper was presented,  Flint Brayton of the Board staff discovered  that 
the unemployment  rate enters  positively  and significantly  in an econometric  model  (fit 
from 1970:1 through 1980:4) designed to explain household passbook savings deposits.  In 
a postsample simulation of his model, the increase in the unemployment  rate from 1981:3 
to 1982:1  induces a rise in the level of savings deposits of $12.6 billion, or 7.2 percent at an 
annual rate, other things being equal.  See  Flint Brayton,  "Econometric  Analysis  of the 
Behavior of Savings Deposits"  (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,  April 
1982). r-  00 
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Table  5.  Actual  and Predicted  Growth  of M2,  1980:1  through  1982:la 
Percent 
Portfolio  equation 
Year and  Predicted 
quarter  Actual  M2  M2  Error 
1980:1  7.4  3.8  3.6 
1980:2  5.2  13.1  -  7.9 
1980:3  14.1  6.5  7.6 
1980:4  8.8  8.3  0.5 
1981:1  7.5  7.6  -0.1 
1981:2  12.0  7.1  4.9 
1981:3  8.3  11.5  -  3.2 
1981:4  8.9  12.9  -4.0 
1982:1  9.7  7.3  2.4 
Memnorandab 
1980  9.2  8.2  1.0 
1981  9.5  10.2  -0.7 
Source:  Same as table 2. 
a.  At seasonally  adjusted annual rates (not compounded). 
b.  Fourth quarter to fourth quarter. 
one-fifth  of MI, has made savings-oriented  motives a more important 
influence on MI demand than they have been in the past. Thus MI 
demand  in the future could respond differently  to movements in eco- 
nomic  variables  than  it has historically. 
Table 5 shows the quarterly behavior of M2 demand relative to 
predictions  from a portfolio  equation  in which interest  rates and wealth 
determine M2. The quarterly  movements in this aggregate were not 
much more predictable than were those of MI during this period. 
Focusing on the most recent quarter, the 93/4  percent M2 growth in 
1982:1  was somewhat  above the equation's  forecast. This expansion  put 
M2, along  with Ml, above the upper  bound  of the FOMC's  annual  range 
by March. 
INTEREST  RATES  AND  MONETARY  TARGETS 
With nonborrowed  reserves as the operating target for monetary 
policy, a pickup  to above-target  growth  in the monetary  aggregates,  as 
in 1982:1, automatically tightens the reserve positions of banks as 
required  reserves rise relative to nonborrowed  reserves. The federal 262  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1982 
funds rate and other short-term  market rates tend to move up. This 
response  pattern  of short-term  rates  to stronger  or weaker  money  growth 
has consistently marked  the period since the inception of the Federal 
Reserve's new operating  procedures in October 1979. (Intermediate- 
and long-term  interest rates are affected by short-term  rates, but are 
strongly influenced by other factors as well. This was apparent  last 
summer when very short-term  rates receded while long-term rates, 
following  passage of the tax cut, continued  their  upward  march.) 
Such behavior  of short-term  rates is predicted  by a theory of money- 
stock determination  when  the money-demand  schedule  (on interest  rate- 
money space) is subject to greater variation than the money-supply 
schedule, and when money-supply  and money-demand  functions  have, 
respectively, positive and negative short-term  interest rate elasticities. 
In this situation,  the Federal  Reserve's procedures  partially  accommo- 
date short-run  divergences  in money demand  from target. At the same 
time, as changed short-rates  alter the quantity of money demanded, 
forces automatically  start  to bring  money partially  back to target. Over 
the longer  run  of three to six months, the Federal  Reserve also tends to 
adjust  the path  for nonborrowed  reserves and the discount  rate, as may 
be needed, to bring  the monetary  aggregates  fully back to path. 
This description  of the process through  which the money supply is 
controlled, combined with the expectations hypothesis of the term 
structure  of interest  rates and  the efficient  markets  hypothesis, explains 
why publication  of an unexpectedly strong  MI figure  after the close of 
the business day on Friday raises interest rates across the maturity 
spectrum  in after-hours  trading.  Market  participants  know, perhaps  only 
intuitively,  that  surprise  in money  demand  in a given  week calls for some 
revision  in the same  direction  in their  expectations  of the money-demand 
schedule in future  weeks also. Over the near  term, if money demand  is 
surprisingly  high, the expected level of the federal funds rate will be 
higher  than  previously  thought  because  of the enlarged  levels of discount 
borrowing  implied  by a fixed  nonborrowed  reserves  operating  target  and 
higher  expected required  reserves. Expectations  of short-term  interest 
rates over a longer period also will be raised if participants  believe the 
Federal  Reserve will, in three to six months, provide  only an amount  of 
reserves able to support  a stock of money consistent with the long-run 
money objective. Future short-term  rates higher than previously ex- 
pected would be needed to bring  the quantity  of money demanded  in David  E. Lindsey  263 
line, given the higher forecasts of future money-demand  schedules. 
Accordingly,  interest rates with maturities  of six months to a year can 
also be expected to rise in line with the higher  expectations for future 
shorter-term  spot rates. 
The response of Treasury  bill rates with these maturities  to Friday 
publication  of the money stock has been substantially  greater since 
October 1979 than before.'8 This behavior suggests that the Federal 
Reserve's determination  to control  annual  money growth  became more 
credible to market  participants  after the institution  of the new proce- 
dures.  My impression,  however, is that  long-term  interest  rates  typically 
have adjusted  by more than is consistent with this mechanism  alone in 
the context of an expectations hypothesis of the term structure. In 
general,  not only Treasury  bill rates but also bond  yields have exhibited 
considerable  variation  over the last two and  one-half  years, and  standard 
economic  theories  do not seem to provide  a convincing  explanation.  For 
these long-term  rates, it appears  that  a puzzle still remains. 
The Optimal Precision of Short-Run Monetary Control 
Financial innovations and instabilities  of money demand in recent 
years have led some to ask whether  the Federal  Reserve should  replace 
monetary  aggregates  with  other  variables  as primary  intermediate  targets 
or, indeed, whether  it should not resort to intermediate  targets  at all. I 
believe monetary aggregates  can be oversold as intermediate  targets. 
However, I also believe that, used flexibly, they offer a better  guide to 
monetary  policy than any alternative  approach.  Assuming  that discre- 
18.  See William Conrad, "Treasury Bill Market Response  to Money Stock Announce- 
ments"  (Board  of  Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System,  January  1981). Conrad 
regressed the change in Treasury bill rates from the Friday closing to the Monday opening 
on the published weekly change in the demand deposit component of M 1. (This independent 
variable,  rather than the change  in MI  itself,  was  used  as a proxy for the unexpected 
change in MI because certain currency data is released a week earlier. He also tried using 
the residuals from time-series  equations,  but with less  success.)  The coefficients  for the 
twelve-month  period  before  October  1979 were  uniformly  smaller and less  significant 
statistically  than for the twelve-month  period following  October  1979. The coefficients 
jumped from generally less than 1 basis point per $1 billion change in demand deposits  to 
a range of 3.7  to 6.7  basis  points for the four maturities of less  than one  year that he 
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tionary adjustments  of the targets, and even of the definitions  of the 
monetary aggregates, are made in response to documented shifts in 
demand  functions  and emerging  financial  innovations,  monetary  aggre- 
gates afford  the most reliable  form of discipline  for discouraging  both a 
procyclical bias and a long-run inflationary  bias in the conduct of 
monetary  policy. A gradual  slowing  of the trend  growth  of the (adjusted) 
aggregates  over time  can assure  a permanent  end to systematic  inflation, 
which  in  turn  is a precondition  for  more  sustainable  real  economic  growth 
than  was observed  in the 1970s.  9 
Even if this general case for targeting  aggregates  is accepted, how 
closely monetary  aggregates  should be kept to their  long-run  path over 
short  periods is a separate  question that raises a different  set of issues. 
During the past several years considerable research effort has been 
devoted to determining  how closely the Federal  Reserve could control 
the money supply in the short run and what changes in institutional 
arrangements  could improve  that  control. By now this work, both inside 
and outside the Federal  Reserve, has provided  adequate  answers, and, 
in most cases, reasonably  precise empirical  estimates of relevant  mag- 
nitudes.20  It seems clear that, even under present regulations  and the 
existing  framework  of operating  procedures,  the Federal  Reserve could 
have kept MI, say, somewhat closer to the midpoint  of its longer-run 
range  than it has and, with changes in regulations  and operating  proce- 
dures,  could have reduced  even further  the size of short-run  divergences 
from  target. 
However, the more fundamental  question is whether the Federal 
Reserve should  tighten  its control  mechanism  and  resist more  forcefully 
and promptly  any short-run  deviations of money from the midpoint  of 
its target range. The general targeting  approach  can be viewed as the 
19.  A  separate  paper would  be  required to  complete  this  Churchillian defense  of 
monetary aggregates by recounting the relative disadvantages  of nominal or real interest 
rates, credit aggregates, nominal or real GNP or the price level as intermediate targets, or 
of dispensing with intermediate targets altogether. 
20.  For a sample of this research see David Lindsey  and others,  "Monetary  Control 
Experience  under  the  New  Operating  Procedures,"  in  Federal  Reserve  Staff,  New 
Monetary Control Procedures,  vol. 2 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
February  1981), and Peter Tinsley  and others,  "Policy  Robustness:  Specification  and 
Simulation of Monthly Money  Market Model,"  presented at the Conference  on Current 
Issues in the Conduct of U.S.  Monetary Policy,  American Enterprise Institute,  February 
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successive determination  of long-run  goals for ultimate  targets, such as 
GNP, prices, or unemployment;  of long-run  objectives for the interme- 
diate  targets, such as a monetary  aggregate;  of short-run  objectives for 
the intermediate  targets; and of short-run  settings for the operating 
instruments,  such as some form  of reserves. The short-run  control  issue 
involves the last two of these steps and can be usefully addressed by 
three  subquestions:2' 
How far should regulatory  and procedural  reforms  go in enhancing 
the short-run  predictability  of the money-supply  function  implied  by the 
reserve  operating  target? 
How far should  regulatory  and  procedural  reforms  go in reducing  the 
short-run  interest  elasticity of this money-supply  function? 
How quickly  should  the Federal  Reserve attempt  to return  the money 
stock to its long-run  objective  following  divergences?22 
In response to these three questions, single-minded  advocates of the 
tightest possible control of the money stock would answer "very far, 
very far, and very fast." On technical grounds, and given their first 
objective of reducing  disturbances  to the supply function, they could 
justifiably recommend a package of contemporaneous,  uniform, and 
universal  reserve  requirements  on the components  of the aggregate  being 
controlled.  Moreover, a switch from a nonborrowed  to a total reserves 
operating  target  would substantially  reduce  the interest  elasticity of the 
21. As noted, arguments  have been made  for dispensing  with the two middle  steps; 
this approach  would  adjust  the operating  instruments  in response  to direct  and  inferential 
information  about the ultimate  targets. While data on all intermediate  variables  would 
provide  such inferential  information,  no intermediate  variable  would be interpreted  as a 
surrogate  target. See, for example, Ralph C. Bryant, Money and Monetary  Policy in 
Interdependent Nations  (Brookings Institution,  1980). 
22. How far regulatory  changes  should  go in fostering  an environment  that  facilitates 
selection  of the appropriate  definition  and  growth  rate  for  the long-run  monetary  objective 
is a related  question  that  has been discussed  in detail  elsewhere. For example,  see James 
L. Pierce, "How Regulations  Affect Monetary  Control,"  and  David E. Lindsey, "Com- 
ment," both presented at the Conference  on Current  Issues in the Conduct of U.S. 
Monetary  Policy, American  Enterprise  Institute,  February  4-5, 1982.  Removal  of deposit 
interest rate ceilings or prohibitions  and payment  of a market-related  interest rate on 
required  reserves certainly  would help. However, as Donald  Kohn has cautioned,  such 
reforms  would  eliminate  the  incentive  for  financial  intermediaries  to offer  separate  accounts 
that  segregate  transactions  and savings  balances  if at the same  time they fully unbundled 
service charges  for check clearing  and account  maintenance  from  rates paid. A measure 
of transactions  balances  would then invariably  be contaminated  by a significant  savings 
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money-supply  relation. (A monetary  base operating  target would pro- 
duce the same result, but would also involve a less predictable  supply 
function in the presence of the other reforms, owing to the greater 
importance  of unexpected disturbances  to currency  demand.)  To mini- 
mize unpredictable  changes in discount borrowing,  which require  off- 
setting open market  operations with a total reserves operating  target, 
such advocates could favor a floating  penalty discount rate. This step, 
by aiding day-to-day  control over total reserves, would impart  a little 
more  predictability  to the money-supply  function.23 
Should  policymakers  heed all this advice and  aim  for tightest  possible 
control  of money?  It would  be desirable  to establish  a predictable  money- 
supply function by having contemporaneous,  uniform, and universal 
reserve  requirements  on transactions  balances,  regardless  of issuer, and 
arbitrage  restrictions. Such reforms would reduce the size of distur- 
bances  in the money-supply  function  that  alter  interest  rates  and  displace 
ances in the money-supply  function  that  alter  interest  rates  and  displace 
the money stock from the target, given nonborrowed  reserves. To be 
sure, the present  practice  of making  judgmental  adjustments  to reserve 
paths between FOMC meetings in response to new information  about 
such disturbances  serves the same purpose. Even so, the process of 
reserve targeting  would be simplified  by such reforms, and some im- 
provement  in monetary  control may result from minimizing  in the first 
place  the occurrence  of disturbances  requiring  such defensive  reactions. 
On the other  hand,  there is a strong  case against  going "much  farther 
or faster than now" in reducing  the interest elasticity of the short-run 
money-supply  function or aiming for a faster return  of money to the 
long-run  objective when money departs  from that objective. It rests on 
interpreting  the positive association between movements  in short-term 
interest rates and MI that has been observed since October 1979 as 
arising  largely  from variations  in the demand  schedule for MI. Present 
procedures  accommodate  some of these variations  on the presumption 
23. Certain  other changes that have been proposed  by monetarists  are inconsistent 
with  the objective  of the tightest  possible  short-run  monetary  control.  For  example,  Milton 
Friedman's  support  for staggered  reserve accounting  and a predetermined  path over 
intervals of several months for open market operations would reduce the short-run 
predictability  of the money-supply  function. Friedman  apparently  is willing  to sacrifice 
some degree  of short-run  control  in order  to reduce  the scope for discretion  on the part  of 
the central  bank.  See Milton  Friedman,  "Monetary  Policy:  Theory  and  Practice,"  Journal 
of Money, Credit and Banking, vol.  14 (February 1982), pp. 98-118. David  E. Lindsey  267 
that, first, such short-run  deviations in money from path do not signifi- 
cantly disturb the economy; and second, a steeper short-run  supply 
function  coupled with greater  determination  to keep it coincident with 
the long-run  money path  at all times would  add significantly  to volatility 
in credit  markets. 
In light  of these considerations,  a target  for nonborrowed  reserves is 
preferable  to a total-reserve  operating  target,  and  a nonvertical  discount 
rate  graduation  is preferable  to a floating  penalty  discount  rate. Further- 
more, when a gap between the money stock and the midpoint  of the 
longer-run  range  opens up in a given month,  the Federal  Reserve should 
not aim at closing it in less than  three months  or so on average. And as 
noted  above, policymakers  should  keep the option  of adjusting  the long- 
run  monetary  target  in response  to reasonably  conclusive indications  of 
permanent  shifts in the money-demand  function. 
Some economists have argued  for a much  tighter  short-run  control  of 
the money supply by offering an alternative  interpretation  of recent 
interest  rate  movements.  In  their  interpretation,  short-term  interest  rates 
respond  positively to that portion  of money-stock  variations  perceived 
as permanent by market participants.24  Economic agents see  such 
permanent  monetary  impulses  as having  future  consequences  for spend- 
ing, credit demands, rate of change of prices, and hence interest rates. 
Thus a policy that would lessen variation  in money and  total reserves- 
and in turn lower market  participants'  perceptions  of variations  in the 
permanent  component of money and reserve shocks-would  reduce, 
not increase, the volatility  of short-term  interest  rates. 
However, there  seem to be several  problems  with  this analysis.  Given 
the lags in the transmission  mechanism  linking  changes in money and 
total reserves to economic activity and prices, it is difficult  to believe 
that  changes in perceptions  of the permanent  component  of money and 
reserves should  affect interest  rates  on assets with maturities  as short  as 
three  to six months. Furthermore,  it is hard  to see why a sizable part  of 
weekly changes  in money should  be expected to be permanent,  let alone 
why they should be expected to modify the longer-run  growth rate of 
24.  See,  for example,  Shadow  Open Market Committee,  "Policy  Statement,"  (Uni- 
versity of Rochester,  Center for Research in Government Policy and Business,  Graduate 
School of Management, March 1982), and Karl Brunner and Allan H. Meltzer, "Strategies 
and Tactics for Monetary Control,"  prepared for the Carnegie-Rochester  Conference  on 
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money. Finally, the changes in the Federal  Reserve's policy that led to 
a stronger  commitment  to meet longer-term  targets  for money growth 
should  have reduced  the perceived  permanence  of short-term  variations 
in money; yet interest  rate volatility  increased  after  the new policy was 
adopted. 
The arguments  for tight short-run  control  of the money stock are not 
supported  by an empirical  model that can explain short-term  interest 
rate and money-stock movements as well as the conventional money- 
supply,  money-demand  framework.25  Unless a convincing  alternative  to 
the money supply-money  demand  framework  is developed and tested, 
policymakers  should be wary of controlling  the stock of money over 
monthly  and  even quarterly  periods  with the precision  that  is technically 
feasible. 
Determining  the appropriate  degree of short-run  accommodation  to 
money-demand  shifts remains difficult. The answer depends on the 
dynamic response of the financial sector and economic activity to 
changes in the reserves instrument  and to shocks to money-supply  and 
money-demand  functions, as well as on the nature  and persistence of 
those shocks. Despite several  laudable  studies,  economists'  understand- 
ing  of what  dynamic  properties  the  monetary  aggregates  and  the  economy 
would display under alternative  monetary  control procedures  remains 
limited.26  Thus there is considerable room for additional  research on 
these, and  related,  topics. 
25. Even though  subject  to sizable  errors  in its money-demand  equation,  the Board's 
monthly  money  market  model  in  one test covering  1980  yielded  better  postsample  forecasts 
of multipliers  relating  MI to reserves or to the monetary  base than an alternative  time- 
series model  proposed  by James  M. Johannes  and  Robert  H. Rasche. (The  results  for the 
nonborrowed  reserve and nonborrowed  base measures  and for M2 multipliers  were not 
greatly  different,  however. See Lindsey and others, "Monetary  Control  Experience," 
table  4.) The Johannes-Rasche  model does not predict  interest  rates. But see the earlier 
discussion  of short-term  interest  rate  forecasts  of the St. Louis  equation  showing  that  very 
large  errors  were implied  in recent  quarters. 
26. See John H. Ciccolo, "Is Short-Run  Monetary  Control Feasible?" in Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York, Monetary Aggregates  and Monetary Policy (FRBNY,  1974), 
pp. 82-91;  Peter  A. Tinsley  and  others, "Money  Market  Impacts  of Alternative  Operating 
Procedures,"  and  Jared  Enzler  and  Lewis Johnson,  "Cycles  Resulting  from  Money  Stock 
Targeting," both in New Monetary Control Procedures,  vols.  2 and 1, respectively. David  E. Lindsey  269 
Discussion 
MUCH  of the discussion  was devoted  to controversy  about  what  quantity, 
price, or interest rate the Federal  Reserve ought to select as its target. 
Robert  J. Gordon  argued  that  the monetary  authorities  ought  to establish 
targets in terms of nominal GNP rather than monetary aggregates. 
Gordon  noted  the difficulties  in selecting  a particular  monetary  aggregate 
to control and argued that when the relation between the aggregate 
measure  and GNP changes, it takes authorities  too long to respond to 
the change. He advocated targeting a two- or three-quarter  moving 
average  of nominal  final sales, with monetary  policy being changed  as 
final sales deviate from their target  path. Albert Wojnilower  suggested 
that the Federal  Reserve has implicitly  used nominal  GNP as its target 
for many  years. However, the policy has been unannounced  because an 
explicit nominal GNP target is not politically feasible. Announcing  a 
GNP  target  comes close to announcing  an unemployment  rate-and one 
that  is often  unacceptable-whereas a monetary  target  implies  no precise 
unemployment  level because of the variability  in velocity. Thus while 
the  Federal  Reserve  has  a nominal  GNP  target  in mind  when  it announces 
its money targets, there is no politically  embarrassing  admission  of an 
associated  unemployment  rate. 
A number  of discussants  suggested  that  the old regime  of interest  rate 
targeting  looks better now that we have had experience with money- 
supply  targeting.  Lawrence Klein argued  that the interest rate and the 
growth rate of  MIB  have fluctuated much more widely since the 
introduction  of money-supply  targeting  in October 1979. He inferred 
that  the new rule  has introduced  far  more  instability  into the system than 
was present under the old operating procedures. Christopher  Sims 
addressed the issue of whether the Federal Reserve should further 
tighten its monetary control mechanisms and resist more forcefully 
short-run  deviations  from the target. He noted that myopic attempts  to 
eliminate  all deviation  in monetary  aggregates  from targets  in the short 
run  could, ironically,  result  in greater  instability  in both the instrument 
and the target. According to his own econometric investigations, it 
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consistent with the instability  described by Klein. Lindsey cautioned 
that  the absolute  errors  of standard  money-demand  functions  had risen 
substantially  in the past two years, suggesting  that  the greater  instability 
of both interest  rates and the money stock could be independent  of the 
change in operating  procedures. Ralph Bryant noted that the focus of 
policy on intermediate  monetary targets, regardless of the particular 
aggregates selected, could easily have undesired consequences. He 
argued  that the current  specification  of ranges  for the monetary  targets 
gave the Federal Reserve more flexibility  than its own rhetoric  might 
suggest. But Bryant  concluded  that the monetary  authorities  are none- 
theless more  rigid  in their  commitment  to the monetary  targets  than  they 
ought  to be in view of the instability  of velocity and of the "multiplier" 
linking  money to bank  reserves. 
Alan Blinder reasoned that a decade ago our knowledge about the 
relations between the relevant variables was too sketchy to permit a 
choice between interest rate targeting  and targeting  the money supply. 
However, the progressive  deregulation  of the financial  system that will 
occur over the next few years now clearly makes interest  rate targeting 
preferable  to the monetarist  prescription.  Gordon  added  that in a world 
of uncertain  money demand,  interest  rate targeting  is probably  the best 
way to implement  a nominal  GNP target  over the next couple of years. 
John  Kareken  took  issue with  the proponents  of interest  rate  targeting. 
He suggested  that  the mentality  of the Federal  Open  Market  Committee 
was the principal  reason  for preferring  money-supply  targets  to interest 
rate  targets  because the committee  would never permit  interest  rates to 
move as much as appropriate  countercyclical  policy required.  Franco 
Modigliani  argued  for targeting  monetary  aggregates,  interest  rates, and 
GNP. When  realizations  of these variables  are  not consistent  with  targets 
or are not consistent with one another,  policymakers  should  attempt  to 
decide why and  then alter  the targets  appropriately. 
Two hypotheses were offered to explain the market reaction to 
the "surprises" in Friday announcements  of money-supply growth. 
Wojnilower  rejected the notion that large fluctuations  in interest rates 
following these announcements  could be attributable  to any kind of 
sober  expectations  process concerning  the longer-term  impact  of money 
surprises.  He offered  instead  the view that  bond  traders  and  participants 
in futures markets  are engaged in a speculative game with short time- 
horizons  in which  key macroeconomic  variables  play  no real  role. Jeffrey David E. Lindsey  271 
Sachs agreed with Lindsey's interpretation  of money surprises and 
offered some supporting  evidence from the foreign exchange market. 
Under  the hypothesis  that surprisingly  high  money  growth  is associated 
with higher  expected rates of future inflation,  unexpected fast money 
growth  would  be associated  with depreciation  of the dollar.  By contrast, 
under  the hypothesis  that  such surprises  are  indicative  of shifts  in money 
demand,  as Lindsey suggests, they would  be associated  with a strength- 
ening  of the dollar.  He reported  that  results  of Jeffrey  Frankel's  research 
support  the second hypothesis. 
William  Poole disagreed  with  two technical  points  raised  by Lindsey's 
paper.  First, he took issue with Lindsey's conclusion  that the shift into 
MI due to introduction  of NOW accounts is over. Pointing  to the New 
England  experience,  he argued  that  this shift  is likely  to take  much  longer 
to  complete. Lindsey responded that the promotional activities of 
depository  institutions  were relatively  prompt  and intense this time, so 
the national  shift  ought  to run  its course faster. Poole also disagreed  that 
Federal  Reserve  policies  are  best characterized  as nonborrowed  reserves 
control. He argued  that Federal  Reserve policy is better characterized 
as free reserves control. If the Lindsey characterization  were correct, 
the monetary authorities would not have to take a position on how 
quickly  to bring  money  growth  back  to the target  path  but  would,  instead, 
allow the market  to make that decision through  bank decisions at the 
discount window or through  their decisions on holding borrowed or 
excess reserves. 